CEF.UP – ECO Webinar

Thursday – December  16^th, 2021 2:00 p.m. | Online

“Why Does Risk Matter More in Recessions than in Expansions?“

Efrem Castelnuovo – University of Padova, CESifo, and Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis (joint work with Martin M. Andreaseny, Giovanni Caggianoz and Giovanni Pellegrino )

CEF.UP – ECO Seminar/ Webinar

Tuesday – December 7^th, 2021 1:00 p.m. | Room 305 | Online

“Commitment and the Dynamics of Household Labor Supply “

Alexandros Theloudis – Tilburg University (joint work with PA Chiappori, JI Giménez-Nadal, JA Molina, J Velilla)

Abstract

“We study household labor supply, within the context of a dynamic collective model, and three prominent intra-household commitment regimes: full commitment, no commitment, and limited commitment. We propose a test that distinguishes among all three alternatives based on how contemporary and historical changes to the economic environment affect household behavior. We implement the test on recent data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics in the US. Although couples and singles behave similarly in many aspects, couples’ labor supply exhibits distinctive features that are consistent with limited commitment. We then use our results to highlight several issues and caveats that arise when testing for commitment in broad risk-sharing settings.”

CEF.UP – ECO Seminar/ Webinar

Tuesday – November 9^th, 2021 1:00 p.m. | Room 305 | Online

“Better Peers but Worse Rank Position: The Opportunity Cost of Joining a Selective Group”

Pilar Beneito – Universitat de València and ERI-CES

Abstract

“The sharp downgrading of the relative position in the distribution of ability experienced by those just qualifying to enter a selective group may run counter to the intended positive effects of joining better peers. I exploit variation in admission cutoffs across different cohorts and types of business majors programs within a same university to study the causal impact that joining a selective group has on the academic performance of marginal students. I first compare students just above and just below the admission cutoff using a regression discontinuity design, and then I analyse the impact of the ability rank on the academic performance of students at the threshold. I find that female students who are just above the cutoff (thus, low-ranked students in a high-ability group) underperform female students who just fail to gain entry to the selective group (thus, high-ranked students in a mixed-ability group). Conversely, I find much smaller or no significant effects among male students. I show that gender differences in the response of students to their ability rank position explain a large part of the differences found at the threshold.”

CEF.UP – ECO Webinar

Friday – July 9^th, 2021 2:00 p.m.

“The trend-cycle connection”

Hernan Bernadaz –  Universidad Carlos III, Madrid (joint work with Florencia Airaudo)

Abstract

“Long-run growth in Latin America over the last 50 years has been low and volatile in the presence of frequent Sudden Stops. We develop a theory that links long-run growth, financial frictions, and Sudden Stops in Emerging countries. Our theory exploits the fact that reversals in trade balance during Sudden Stops occur through sharp declines in imports, particularly of imported investment, rather than increases in exports. Imported investment, in turn, has a permanent impact on economic growth. We find that trend growth deteriorates during Sudden Stops and, even though trend shocks play a crucial role, financial frictions and shocks have a significant impact on its dynamics. We apply our model to the Sudden Stops in Argentina since the 1950s and find that financial crises have a strong permanent effect on the trend, that is, to a large extent, the trend is the cycle.”

CEF.UP – ECO Webinar

Tuesday – May 11^th, 2021 3:00 p.m.

“Necessary and Sufficient conditions for Determinacy of Asymptotically Stationary Equilibria in OLG Models”

Anna Rubinchik –  Western Galilee College, Israel (joint work with Alexander Gorokhovsky)

Abstract:

We propose a criterion for verifying whether a local policy analysis can be made in an overlapping generations model,  i.e., whether a given equilibrium is determinate. The criterion is applicable for a generic set of parameters of the model, and in case of indeterminacy, it indicates the nature of the problem: multiplicity of equilibria or their absence for near-by parameters.

The criterion can be applied to models with infinite past and future as well as those with a truncated past.

The equilibrium is not necessarily a steady state; for example, demographic- and type-composition of the population and endowments can change over time.

However, asymptotically, the equilibrium should be stationary. The two limiting stationary paths at either end of the timeline do not have to be the same. If they are, conditions for local uniqueness are far more stringent for an economy with a truncated past as compared to its counterpart with an infinite past.

In addition, we illustrate our main result using a text-book model with a single physical good, a two-period life-cycle and a single type of consumer. In this model we show how to calculate a response to a policy change using the implicit function theorem.

CEF.UP – ECO Webinar

Friday – January 8^th, 2021  3:00 p.m.

Comparative European Institutions and the Little Divergence, 1385-1800

Nuno Palma –   Manchester University (joint work with António Castro Henriques)

Abstract:

Why did the countries which first benefited from access to the New World –Castile and Portugal –decline relative to their followers, especially England and the Netherlands? The dominant narrative is that worse initial institutions at the time of the opening of Atlantic trade explain Iberian divergence. In this paper, we build new quantitative measures which allow for a comparison of institutional quality over time. We consider the frequency and nature of parliamentary meetings, the frequency and intensity of extraordinary taxation and coin debasement, and real interest spreads for public debt. We find no evidence that the political institutions of Iberia were worse at least until the English Civil War.