CEF.UP – FIN Seminar/Webinar

Thursday – November 28^th, 2024 at 1:00 p.m. | Room 305| Online

“Poison Bonds“

Rex Wang Renjie  – VU Amsterdam University (Netherlands), Tinbergen Institute (Netherlands)

Abstract:

“This paper documents the rise of “poison bonds”—corporate bonds that allow bondholders to demand immediate repayment in change-of-control events. The share of poison bonds among new issues has grown substantially in recent years, from below 20% in the 1990s to over 60% since the mid-2000s, predominantly driven by investment-grade issues. We show that a key factor behind this rise is shareholders’ aversion to poison pills, leading firms to issue poison bonds as an alternative. Moreover, our analysis suggests that this practice can entrench incumbent managers and destroy shareholder value. Holding a portfolio of firms that remove poison pills but promptly issue poison bonds generates negative abnormal returns of -7.3% per year. Our findings have important implications for the agency theory of debt: (i) more debt may not discipline the management; and (ii) even without financial distress, managerial entrenchment can lead to agency conflicts between shareholders and creditors.”